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Models of consumer behavior play a key role in modern empirical Industrial Organization. In this
paper, I survey some of the models used in this literature. In particular, I discuss two commonly used
demand systems: multi-stage budgeting approaches and discrete choice models. I motivate their use
and highlight some key modeling assumptions. I next briefly discuss key issues of estimation, and
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zation. In this paper, I survey some of the models used in this literature. In particular,
I discuss two commonly used demand systems: multi-stage budgeting approaches and
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1 Introduction
The empirical analysis of consumer behavior has a long and rich history in economics and
econometrics. The ￿rst statistical estimation of demand dates back at least to Moore (1914).1
Early work treated estimation as merely a way of summarizing data, and had little connection
with economic theory. Since the pioneering work of Stone (1954) econometricians estimating
demand systems have struggled with the need for ￿ exible functional forms, which do not
impose a prior the data cannot overcome, while keeping a connection to economic theory
(either by imposing it, or ￿nding ways to test it). Examples include the Rotterdam model
(Theil, 1965; and Barten 1966), the Translog model (Christensen, Jorgenson, and Lau, 1975),
and the Almost Ideal Demand System (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980a). Deaton (1986) o⁄ers
a comprehensive review of this literature.
￿I wish to thank Charles Manski for comments on an earlier draft.
1Moore￿ s work was pre-dated by attempts to summarize relations between quantities and prices, see
Schultz (1938) and Stigler (1954) for a survey of the early work and a discussion of Moore￿ s contributions.
1A parallel line of research treats goods as bundles of attributes, rather than qualitatively
di⁄erent products (Gorman, 1980, Lancester 1966 and Rosen, 1974). Within this class of
characteristics based models especially prevalent is the study of discrete choice (McFadden,
1974), which like the work on demand model, also emphasizes the direct and close connection
between economic theory, econometrics and empirical work. See McFadden (1981, 1984) and
Train (2003) for surveys of this line of research.
Since the mid 1980￿ s, however, many researchers in some ￿elds of applied micro econo-
metrics have lost interest in estimating consumer behavior. Instead, the focus, in some
empirical ￿elds, shifted to estimation of so called casual, or treatment e⁄ects, models using
natural and quasi experiments. This shift was not uniform across and within all ￿elds of
micro economics. Industrial Organization (IO) is one of the ￿elds where empirical analysis
of consumer behavior gained prominence during this period. Estimation of demand for dif-
ferentiated products plays a key role in modern empirical IO. Indeed, several of the recent
developments in the study of consumer behavior have been within the ￿eld of IO, which
might seem out of place since IO is historically mainly associated with study of competition
and the supply side.
IO economists￿are interested in estimating consumer behavior for several reasons. Two
leading examples are to infer ￿rm conduct and to measure (changes in) consumer welfare.
An important part of IO involves trying to understand ￿rm conduct. Unfortunately, we
have little data to study conduct directly. Therefore, a basic exercise is to ￿rst estimate
consumer behavior, then use the demand estimates to "reverse engineer" ￿rm behavior and
either test among competing theories of ￿rm conduct or use a particular theory to simulate
a counterfactual. For example, a researcher could estimate how consumers choose between
di⁄erent types of cars and use the estimates to compute the consumers￿price sensitivity.
Given this price sensitivity the researcher can compute the optimal markup implied by
di⁄erent theories of pricing and choose the theory that best ￿ts observed data. In addition
the researcher might also want to compute how the ￿rms change their (pricing) behavior as a
result of change in the environment, say due to a proposed merger or a change in regulation.
See Bresnahan (1981) for an early example of this type of work, or Einav and Levin (2010)
for a recent non-technical survey. Another reason IO economists are interested in consumer
behavior is to measure consumer welfare. For example, we might want to evaluate the welfare
e⁄ects of a proposed merger or the gain from the introduction of new goods.
2Since consumer demand plays a key role in the above exercise, IO economists have spent
signi￿cant time and e⁄ort in modeling and estimating demand, especially in industries with
many di⁄erentiated products. In this paper, I will discuss some general lessons we learned
from examining consumer behavior; and survey the main challenges and methods used to
deal with these challenges. This paper is not a complete survey of demand modeling over
the last couple of decades, and as such I leave out many developments and probably over
emphasize IO related work. I try when possible to put the developments in IO within an
historical context as well as relate to literature in related areas.
2 Some General Findings
Before surveying the methods it is useful to outline some general ￿ndings we have learned
regarding consumer behavior. O⁄ering these lessons up front helps explain some of the
modeling choices emphasized in the literature. The two lessons are: (1) consumers view (even
seemingly identical) products as di⁄erentiated and (2) consumers tastes are heterogenous.
2.1 Products are Di⁄erentiated
Economists tend to have strong priors regarding the relevance of di⁄erentiation, in many
cases assuming that products are essentially identical. One of the key lessons learned from
the data is that this is not true: almost all products are di⁄erentiated. It is easier to convince
economists that some products are vertically di⁄erentiated. For example, at equal prices it
is easy to claim that most (all?) consumers prefer a BMW to a Skoda. Di⁄erentiation arises,
in equilibrium, because the price of the BMW will be higher and only some consumers are
willing to pay the higher price.
Convincing economists that more narrowly de￿ned products are horizontally di⁄erenti-
ated is harder. For example, many will claim that Coke and Pepsi, or Post Raisin Bran and
Kellogg Raisin Bran are essentially identical, that two supermarket chains are not di⁄eren-
tiated in a meaningful way or that two American cars are not distinguishable. Consumers,
however, tend to strongly disagree. When the price of one product declines we tend to see
a decline in the sales of a competing product, but the decline is signi￿cantly less than what
we would expect if the products were nearly homogenous. This ￿nding is quite general and
3is con￿rmed by many studies from numerous markets that vary by products, location and
time, and use consumer level data or data aggregated at di⁄erent levels.
There are many ways di⁄erentiation could arise. It could be due to inherent di⁄erences
between products, information imperfections among consumers, marketing and advertising
campaigns, or some sort of brand inertia. For some applications it is important to separate
between these di⁄erent explanations. Indeed, an interesting area of future research is to
better understand the sources of this di⁄erentiation. However, from a more practical point
of view, if one wants to explain consumer behavior this di⁄erentiation needs to be accounted
for.
When working with data, one quickly learns that product attributes can explain some of
the di⁄erentiation among products, but far from all of it. A store brand toasted oats cereal
might have identical characteristics to General Mills Cheerios, yet even when Cheerios is
priced much higher its sales are higher than the store brand. As we will see below, typically,
this is accounted for by allowing for unobserved product level attributes, which will have
important implications for how we estimate the model.
2.2 Consumers are Heterogenous
A second, somewhat related lesson, is the importance of consumer heterogeneity. Consumers
are heterogenous in their tastes and in their income and as a result quite di⁄erent in the
choices they make. This is con￿rmed in market level data, but more importantly using
consumer level choice data (for example, see Browning and Carro, 2007).
Interestingly, the heterogeneity in choice is only weakly correlated with standard con-
sumer attributes. Income, education and family size obviously explain some dimensions
of choice, but are far than enough to accurately predict consumer behavior. Unobserved
heterogeneity is important to model in many cases.
3 Modeling Consumer Behavior
I now discuss how to model consumer demand in the presence of many di⁄erentiated prod-
ucts. I ￿rst outline the problem, then discuss some simple yet unsatisfactory, for IO purposes,
solutions. The heart of this section is a discussion of the most commonly used models of
demand.
43.1 The Problem
Suppose we are interested in estimating demand for J di⁄erentiated products. The most
straight-forward approach to model consumer demand is to write down an aggregate demand
system of the form
q = D(p;r;") (1)
where q is a J ￿ 1 vector of quantities demanded, p is a J ￿ 1 vector of prices, r is a
vector of exogenous variables, and " is a J ￿ 1 vector of random shocks. Early work in
demand estimation followed this approach, and the main modeling concern was to specify
D(￿) in a way that was both ￿ exible and consistent with economic theory. Examples of
resulting demand systems are the Linear Expenditure model (Stone, 1954), the Rotterdam
model (Theil, 1965; and Barten 1966), the Translog model (Christensen, Jorgenson, and
Lau, 1975), and the Almost Ideal Demand System (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980a).
This approach, while intuitive, ends up being problematic in many cases considered in
IO for several reasons.
First, as the number of options, J, becomes large there is a dimensionality problem
due to the large number of parameters to be estimated. For example, consider a linear
demand system, D(p;r;") = Ap + ", where A is J ￿ J matrix of parameters. This system
implies J2 parameters to be estimated. The number of parameters to be estimated can be
somewhat reduced by imposing symmetry of the Slutsky matrix and other constraints implied
by economic theory, but the number of parameters to be estimated is still proportional to
J2, and too large to be manageable for a large number of options. Of course, with a more
￿ exible functional form, the problem is even greater.
Second, in come cases the key interest is not aggregate demand, but a model of individual
consumer behavior: for some applications we would like to explicitly model and estimate the
distribution of heterogeneity. The above approach, generally, does not let us do this. We
should note that the mere presence of heterogeneity does not invalidate the approach of
using an aggregate demand system. Under well speci￿ed conditions, that preferences are
of the Gorman form (Gorman, 1959), we know that even with heterogeneity an aggregate
demand system is well de￿ned and can be treated as coming from a single representative
consumer. The existence of heterogeneity does suggest that we should be careful in imposing
5the restrictions of economic theory on the aggregate demand, since the conditions required
for aggregation might not hold.
Third, and somewhat related, the aggregate representative consumer demand system
does not easily allow for explicit parametrization of speci￿c consumer behavior. For exam-
ple, suppose we want to model demand for a storable good and account for the ability of
consumers to store. A natural way to model this behavior is by an inventory model, where
consumers make decisions based on their current inventory, storage costs, their expected fu-
ture consumption needs and expected prices (see Hendel and Nevo, 2006b, for an example).
The modeling exercise is much easier when we start with an explicit model of consumer
behavior and aggregate to market level aggregate demand.
Fourth, this demand system does not easily allow us to predict the demand for new goods.
As we will see below once we relate products to their characteristics we would be able, to
some degree to predict the demand for new goods. How well we can predict the demand
depends on the importance of unobserved product speci￿c characteristics.
Finally, estimating the above demand system usually faces several empirical problems.
Prices of narrowly de￿ned products typically are highly collinear, making it di¢ cult to
separately identify the price e⁄ects of individual products. This problem is augmented since
we typically think that prices are correlated with the error terms and require an instrumental
variable (IV) for each price. Finding a single IV is not easy, making it almost impossible to
￿nd enough IV that are both exogenous and will not generate moment conditions that are
not nearly collinear.
3.2 Aggregation and Symmetry
Aggregation and symmetry are two, potentially easy, ways to solve some of the above issues,
especially the dimensionality problem. Aggregation has a long history in demand analysis
dating back at least to Gorman (1959). Symmetry assumptions were widely used in early
theoretical models of product di⁄erentiation (Spence, 1976; Dixit and Stiglitiz, 1976). Both
these approaches are very powerful but require strong assumptions that might be applicable
in some cases but not in others.
One way to solve the dimensionality problem is to aggregate the individual products into
aggregate commodities. In many cases aggregation might indeed make sense. In particular,
if the researcher does not care about the substitution between the di⁄erent products, only
6the overall demand. For example, in some cases we might only want to know the demand
for cars as a function of some average price. In this case we can estimate some version of
equation (1) using only the total number of cars, but not the speci￿c model.
Aggregation clearly has its advantages. The most important is that with more aggrega-
tion, possibly to a single aggregate, we can allow for ￿ exible, even non-parametric, functional
forms. But for many IO problems aggregating to the level of the industry misses the point:
in many cases we care exactly about the substitution between the speci￿c products. It is
worth noting that almost all studies employ some level of aggregation. For example, most
studies of the automobile market aggregate over various trims and option packages and de￿ne
a product as a "model." So the real question is not whether to aggregate ￿we almost always
do ￿but to what level and whether this aggregation solves the dimensionality problem.
The answer to the question of how much to aggregate depends on two things. First,
what we are interested in. Obviously, if we care about substitution between products then
aggregate demand cannot answer this question. However, even if we only care about total
quantity, aggregation might be problematic. In order to aggregate we need to compute an
average price, or price index. If prices of all the products we are aggregating over are highly
correlated it is easy to compute this price (Hicks, 1936), but more generally computing the
correct average price is more di¢ cult. Without further assumptions one needs to know the
substitution between the products ￿the exact thing we are trying to avoid having to estimate
￿in order to compute the correct price index. See Blundell and Stoker (2007) and references
therein, for the various assumptions used in the literature in order to justify aggregation.
So the second key to deciding on how much to aggregate has to do with the correlation of
prices and the substitution between the products we are aggregating over: the more prices
are correlated and the better substitutes the products the easier it is to compute the correct
price to use.
An alternative way to solve the dimensionality problem is to impose symmetry across
products. Theses type of models are used mostly in the trade and macro literature, as well
as in the applied theory literature. The models tend to be easy to work with analytically,
and can handle a large number of products. However, they cannot ￿t many patterns in micro
data.
A leading example of a model that imposes strong symmetry assumptions is the constant
elasticity of substitution (CES) demand model (Spence, 1976; Dixit and Stiglitiz, 1976),










where ￿ is a constant parameter. This parametrization is quite popular because it combines
a relatively simple functional form with a parameter that measures the taste for variety. For
￿ = 1 we get linear preferences, or perfect substitution between products, while as ￿ ! 1
we get Leontief preferences, or perfect complements.








I i = 1;:::;J (2)
where I is the income of the representative consumer.
Comparing equation (2) to equation (1) shows the power of the functional form as-
sumption. Instead of having a number of parameters proportional to J2, we have a single
parameter to estimate, regardless of the number of products. We solved the dimensionality












In words, the cross-price elasticities of i and k with respect to the price of j are restricted to
be equal, regardless of how close a substitute the products really are. So while the functional
form is convenient it imposes a very strong restriction on the demand system. The simplicity
of the model and its analytic tractability make it a popular choice in theory and it is also
heavily used in trade and in macro, but it is not appropriate to explain micro data and is
essentially never used in empirical IO.
3.3 Most Commonly Used Demand Systems
The most commonly used demand systems in IO can be separated into two types: demand in
product space and demand in characteristics space. The demand systems in product space
continue to have a basic structure like that of equation (1), but solve the dimensionality
8problem by assuming the utility is separable and therefore we can split the products into
groups and estimate a ￿ exible demand system within a group and between groups.
The demand systems in characteristics space solve the dimensionality problem by pro-
jecting the products onto a characteristics space. Within this class of models we will focus
on discrete choice models. Recalling our ￿rst general lesson ￿the importance of product
di⁄erentiation and the di¢ culty of capturing this di⁄erentiation with just product attributes
￿we will pay particular attention to the modeling of unobserved product attributes in the
discrete choice model.
3.3.1 Separability
This class of models rely on an aggregate demand relation as in equation (1), but solve the
dimensionality problem by dividing the products into smaller groups and allow for a ￿ exible
functional form within each group.
In order to formally motivate the split into groups, or segments, we would like to write the
consumer￿ s problem, of maximizing utility from consumption of the di⁄erent products, as a
sequence of separate but related decision problems. First, the consumer allocates expenditure
to broad groups of products and then this expenditure is allocated to sub-groups of products,
eventually allocated to a particular product. At each stage the allocation decision is a
function of only that group total expenditure and prices of commodities in that group (or
price indexes for the sub-groupings).
There are various conditions that will guarantee that the solution to this multi-stage
process will equal the solution to the original consumer problem (see Deaton and Muell-
bauer, 1980a, chapter 5). One condition is to assume weak separability of preferences. Let
e q1;e q2;:::; e qG be G subvectors of the vector e q = (q1;q2;:::;qJ) such that each product is only in
one group. Then the utility is weakly separable if
U(e q) = f (v1(e q1);v2 (e q2);:::vG (e qG))
where f(￿) is some increasing function and v1;:::;vG are the sub-utility functions associated
with separate groups.
Weak separability is necessary and su¢ cient for the last stage of the multi-stage process;
if a subset of products appears only in a separable sub-utility function, then the quantities
9demanded of these products can always be written as only a function of group expenditures
and prices of other products within the group.
In order to justify that the higher stages of the decision process ￿those that allocate
expenditure between sub groups of products ￿further assumptions are needed. For example
we can rely on indirect utility functions for each segment are of the Generalized Gorman
Polar Form, and that the overall utility is separable additive in the sub-utilities (see Deaton
and Muellbauer, 1980a, chapter 5, for a rigorous treatment).
The idea of multi-stage budgeting was originally developed for the estimation of broad
categories of products such as food, clothing and shelter. Hausman, Leonard, and Zona
(1994) and Hausman (1996) use the idea of multi-stage budgeting to construct a multi-level
demand system for di⁄erentiated products. Their implementation is best illustrated by an
example. Hausman, Leonard, and Zona (1994) estimate demand for beer and Hausman
(1996) estimates demand for ready to eat cereal. Both papers have a similar structure with
a category level demand as the highest level, a middle level that captures demand for speci￿c
segments (say family or kids cereal) and a lower level that represents demand for particular
brands (Cheerios and Corn Flakes). Each level allows for a ￿ exible functional form.
In particular, assume the data are for j = 1;:::;J products in t = 1;:::;T markets. In
the lowest level they assume an Almost Ideal Demand System. The demand, or expenditure
share, of product j in segment g in market t is given by
sjt = ￿j + ￿j ln(ygt=￿gt) +
Jg X
k=1
￿jk ln(pkt) + "jt (3)
where, sjt is the dollar sales share of product j out of total segment expenditure, ygt is overall
per capita segment expenditure, ￿gt is the segment level price index, and pkt is the price of
product k in market t. This system de￿nes a ￿ exible functional form that can allow for a
wide variety of substitution patterns within the segment. It has two additional advantages
over other ￿ exible demand systems (like the Rotterdam system or the Translog model):
(1) it aggregates well over individuals; and (2) it is easy to impose (or test) theoretical
restrictions, like adding-up, homogeneity of degree zero and symmetry (for details see Deaton
and Muellbauer, 1980a).
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The exact form of the price index does not seem to be important for the results (Deaton and
Muellbauer, 1980a pg 316-317). If the latter is used the estimation is non-linear, while with
the Stone index the estimation can be performed using linear methods.
The middle level of demand models the allocation between segments, and can be mod-
eled using the Almost Ideal Demand System, in which case equation (3) is used with both
expenditure shares and prices aggregated to a segment level (the prices are aggregated using
either (4) or (5)). An alternative is the log-log equation used by Hausman, Leonard, and
Zona (1994) and Hausman (1996):
ln(qgt) = ￿g + ￿g ln(YRt) +
G X
k=1
￿k ln(￿kt) + "gt
where qgt is the quantity sold of products in the segment g in market t, YRt is total category
(e.g., cereal) expenditure, and ￿kt are the segment price indices (computed using either either
(4) or (5)).
As we mentioned above, in order to be consistent with exact two-stage budgeting the
segment level demand system needs to satisfy several conditions, which are not satis￿ed by
commonly used demand systems. In some cases, the approach can still be justi￿ed as an
approximate two stage budgeting approach. Although in practice these additional constraints
are mostly ignored.
Finally, at the top level the demand for the category is speci￿ed as
ln(Qt) = ￿0 + ￿1 ln(It) + ￿2 ln￿t + Zt￿ + "t
where Qt is the overall consumption of the category in market t, It is real income, ￿t is the
price index for the category and Zt are variables that shift demand.
113.4 Models in Characteristics Space and Discrete Choice
Up to now we focused on demand in product space and looked for restrictions, through ag-
gregation, symmetry or separability, to reduce the dimension of the problem. An alternative
approach is to view a product as a collection of characteristics (Gorman, 1980, Lancester,
1966). The basic idea is somewhat similar to what we saw in the previous section: some
products are better substitutes to each other than others. However, rather than separating
the products into discrete segments we use the attributes of the products to derive their
relative substitutability. The dimensionality problem is solved by making the relevant di-
mension the dimension of the characteristics, and not the number of products. A key issue
to deal with is how to specify unobserved product attributes, which as we claimed in Section
2 are key to explaining the data. There are several ways to operationalize this approach, but
the most popular, and the one I focus on here, is based on the discrete choice model.
A typical speci￿cation of the model starts with the indirect utility of consumer i from
consuming product j in market t, U(xjt;￿jt;Ii ￿ pjt;￿i;￿), which is a function of observed
and unobserved (by the researcher) product characteristics, xjt and ￿jt respectively, income
minus price, Ii ￿ pjt ; individual characteristics, ￿i ; and unknown parameters, ￿ . Here I
present a very simple, linear, utility model and discuss extensions later. Assume that the
(conditional) indirect utility is
uijt = ￿i(Ii ￿ pjt) + xjt￿i + ￿jt + "ijt (6)
where Ii is the income of consumer i, xjt = (x1
jt;:::;xK
jt) is a 1 ￿ K vector of observable
characteristics of product j; and "ijt is a stochastic term. ￿i is consumer￿ s i marginal utility
from income, ￿i is K ￿ 1 vector of individual speci￿c taste-coe¢ cients.
An important part of this speci￿cation is the unobserved characteristic, ￿jt: In many
cases we might doubt the ability of observed characteristics to capture the essence of the
product. For example, Hausman (1996, pg 229) comments that "it is di¢ cult to conceive
how I would describe Apple-Cinnamom Cheerios in terms of its attributes." The unobserved
characteristic is meant to address these type of concerns. It captures unobserved attributes
of the product, unquanti￿able factors (￿brand equity￿ ), systematic shocks to demand, or
unobserved promotional activity. An important lesson, which we stated in Section 2, is that
this unobserved characteristic is essential to explain the data. For estimation, the existence
12of ￿jt implies that prices, as well as other choice variables, could be endogenous, if ￿rms
observe ￿jt before making decisions.
The last part of the utility is the stochastic term, "ijt. This term is essential to explaining
micro behavior: without it we cannot rationalize why consumers faced with the same choice
set (and prices) make di⁄erent choices. There are two types of interpretation of this shock,
and the utility de￿ned by equation (6). The ￿rst is that utility from a brand is deterministic,
but the choice process itself is probabilistic (see for example, Tversky, 1972). The individual
will not necessarily choose the alternative with the highest utility, rather has a positive
probability of choosing each of the various options. Under this interpretation the "￿ s are
not part of the utility, and only introduce randomness into the choice process, which is
not taste-related. The second interpretation is that the true utility used by consumers to
make choices is deterministic, but due to the researcher￿ s inability to formulate individual
behavior precisely an additional stochastic term is added. Thus, making utility stochastic
from the researcher￿ s point of view (see Manski 1977; and McFadden 1981, 1984). This is
the interpretation followed in the economics literature and the one I follow here.
An interesting interplay is between ￿jt and "ijt: At this point it might not be clear that
we need both, in a way all the ￿jt is doing is changing the mean of "ijt, by j and t. We will
return to this point in Section 6.1, where we discuss consumer welfare and explore a model
without "ijt:
While most studies take the indirect utility as the fundamental building block, we should
note that we typically think of it as coming from a well speci￿ed utility maximization prob-
lem. Understanding the foundations underpinning the model is not just a formality, it
imposes some restrictions on the functional form of the indirect utility. The formal deriva-
tion of the problem is beyond the scope of this paper, but let me demonstrate some of
the issues. Suppose the consumer￿ s preferences can be represented by a continuous utility
function, U(Q0;Qt), where Q0 is the amount consumed of the numØraire and Qt is the con-
sumption of the "inside" good. This utility is maximized subject to a budget constraint.
Conditional on choosing one of the J options for the inside good the conditional indirect
utility can be written in some form like equation (6). For example, if utility is quasi linear,
i.e., U = f(Qt)+Q0 with f0 > 0 > f00, and f(Qt) = xjt￿i+￿jt+"ijt; then the conditional in-
direct utility will be given by equation (6). On the other hand, if the utility is Cobb-Douglas,
13U = Q￿
0f(Qt)1￿￿; then the indirect utility will be given by
uijt = ￿ln(Ii ￿ pjt) + xjt￿i + ￿jt + "ijt: (7)
Note that while linearity of price might seem like a very special case, it is implied by quasi-
linearity of preferences, which for many products seems like a reasonable assumption.
The derivation from an underlying utility function imposes at least two immediate restric-
tions. First, the term Ii ￿ pjt should enter the utility and not pjt alone. In the quasi-linear
case, Ii, can be dropped without loss of generality since it will just shift all utility by a con-
stant. More generally, however, this is not true. Second, if we believe that the underlying
utility is given by U(Q0;Qt) then indirect utility should be weakly separable in Ii ￿ pjt and
f(Qt): In other words, the interactions between the "price term" and product attributes are
limited. For example, under this utility function it is not kosher to allow for a di⁄erent price
coe¢ cient for each product. An alternative speci￿cation of utility de￿nes it directly on the
characteristics, U(Q0;x;￿;"); allows for interactions between the utility from the numØraire
and the speci￿c attributes. For some products this extra ￿ exibility makes sense, but for
others it does not. We return to this point when we discuss more ￿ exible functional forms
for the indirect utility.
The consumer-level taste parameters are modeled as
￿i = ￿ +
d X
r=1
￿1rDir + ￿1vi1; (8)
￿ik = ￿k +
d X
r=1
￿(k+1)rDir + ￿k+1vi(k+1) for k = 1;:::;K
where, Di = (Di1;:::;Did)0 is a d ￿ 1 vector of observed demographic variables, vi =
(vi1;:::;vi(K+1))0 is a vector of K + 1 unobserved consumer attributes. ￿ is a (K + 1) ￿ d
matrix of parameters and ￿ = (￿1;:::;￿K+1) is a vector of parameters. If we have individual
level data then the demographics, Di, are the individual attributes observed in this data.
Sometimes we will not observe the demographics at the individual level but we will know
their distribution, denoted by PD: The joint distribution of (vi1;:::;vi(k+1)) is given by Fv,
which is typically assumed to be standard normal:
14The speci￿cation of the demand system is completed with the introduction of an ￿outside
good￿ : the consumers may decide not to purchase any of the brands. The indirect utility
from this outside option is
ui0t = ￿iIi + "i0t
Let ￿ = (￿;￿;￿;￿) denote the parameters of the model. Combining equations (6) and (8),
and dropping the term Ii, which just shifts all utilities by a constant and therefore does not
impact relative utilities or choice,
uijt = ￿jt(xt;pt;￿t;￿;￿) + ￿ijt(xt;pt;Di;￿;￿) + "ijt
where ￿jt = xjt￿￿￿pjt+￿jt is the mean utility across consumers. The variation around this


















captures the interaction of consumer demographics and product attributes. The second, is
the random term, "ijt. Before we have made any distributional assumptions the two terms
are interchangeable.
For now we assume that consumers purchase one unit of the good, which gives the highest
utility. We will later discuss how we can relax this assumption. Thus, the probability that
a consumer of type (Di;vi) chooses option j is
sijt = sijt(xt;￿t;pt;Di;vi;￿) =
Z
1[uijt ￿ uikt 8l j xt;￿t;pt;Di;vi;￿]dF"("): (9)
where xt = (x1t;:::;xJt); ￿t = (￿1t;:::;￿Jt); pt = (p1t;:::;p:Jt) and 1[A] is an indicator function
that equals one if the event A is true. For estimation purposes we will integrate this prob-
ability over the unobserved consumer attributes, vi, or even over all consumer attributes.
(Di;vi); to get market shares
sjt = sjt(xt;￿t;pt;￿) =
Z
sijt(xt;￿t;pt;Di;vi;￿)dFD(D)dFv(v) (10)
15In order to estimate the model, using either consumer or market level data, we make
assumptions on the distribution of the (unobserved) individual attributes and compute this
integral.
Di⁄erent distributional assumptions will yield di⁄erent models and have implications for
the patterns of substitutions. Possibly the simplest assumptions we can make are that (1)
￿ = 0 and ￿ = 0, which implies ￿i = ￿ and ￿i = ￿ for all i; (2) "ijt are iid; and (3) "ijt are
distributed according to a Type I extreme value distribution. These assumptions yield the
(multinomial) Logit model and the market share of brand j in market t, is given by
sjt =
expfxjt￿ ￿ ￿pjt + ￿jtg
1 +
PJ
k=1 expfxkt￿ ￿ ￿pkt + ￿ktg
(11)
This model is appealing due to its tractability, but it signi￿cantly restricts the substitution












if j = k
otherwise
There are two problems with these elasticities. First, in most cases the market shares are
small, so ￿(1￿sjt) is nearly constant and therefore the own-price elasticities are proportional
to price. This implies that the lower the price, the lower the elasticity (in absolute value),
and when plugged into a standard pricing model predicts a higher markup for the lower-
priced brands. One question is whether this pattern is reasonable, but more importantly
this pattern is a direct implication of the functional form. If, for example, indirect utility
was a function of the logarithm of price, rather than price, then the implied elasticity would
be roughly constant. In other words, the functional form directly determines the patterns of
own price elasticity.
An additional problem, which has been stressed in the literature, is with the cross-price
elasticities. We note that the cross price elasticity with respect to a change in the price of
product k is that same for all products such that j 6= k: Essentially, what is happening is
that when the price of k increases, some consumers will no longer view it as their top option
and will substitute to their next option. Since the only heterogeneity across consumers is in
the form of the iid "ijt; the consumers, who are no longer choosing k, value the other options
like the average consumer and will choose that option at the same frequency as the market
share. Hence, the percent change in the market share is constant.
16In reality, we think that consumers who no longer choose option k are more likely, than
the average consumer, to choose similar options. For example, consumers whose top option
is a BMW are more likely to choose another luxury car as their second option. In order
to capture this we need the variation around the mean utility to vary systematically across
options. This can be done in one of two ways. First, we could generate the correlation
by allowing "ijt to be correlated across j (i.e., relax assumption (2) above). Alternatively,
we could generate the correlation by allowing for heterogeneity in the tastes (i.e., relax
assumption (1) above). It is important to note, that assumption (3), of an extreme value
distribution, allows us to obtain a closed form expression for the market shares, but otherwise
it plays little role in driving the patterns of elasticities . The same issues are present if we
assume other (iid) distributions. For example, if we assumed "ijt are distributed normal.
A simple model that attempts to deal with the problem of the cross price elasticities is
the Nested Logit model. Continue to assume ￿ = 0 and ￿ = 0; and divide the products
into mutually exclusive nests, g = 1;:::;G. Finally, let "ijt = ￿"ig(j)t + "1
ijt, where "1
ijt is
an iid extreme value shock, "ig(j)t is a shock common to all options in segment g, and ￿
is a parameter that captures the relative importance of the two. Assuming a particular
distribution for "ig(j)t (see Cardell, 1997) we get the Nested Logit model. Note, that if ￿ = 0
we are back to the Logit model. The Nested Logit model is a private case of the more general
Generalized Extreme Value model (McFadden, 1978), which imposes correlation among the
options through correlation in "ijt: In principle one could consider estimating an unrestricted
variance-covariance matrix of the shock, "ijt . This, however, reintroduces the dimensionality
problem discussed above since it involves estimating a number of parameters proportional to
J2. See Hausman and Wise (1978) for an application following this approach with a small
number of options.
There have been several criticisms of these models. First, they do not deal with the
problem with own price elasticities. Second, is the requirement for a-priori known segments.
In principle the nesting structure can be tested. But in practice the tests are not very
powerful.
A di⁄erent solution to the problem with the elasticities is o⁄ered by the Mixed Logit or
Random Coe¢ cients Logit, as described by equations (6) and (8). An early version of this
model was introduced by Boyd and Mellman (1980) and Cardell and Dunbar (1980). More
recently, versions of the model were discussed in Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) and
17McFadden and Train (2000). This model addresses both of the concerns with the elasticities
by allowing for heterogeneity. We assume that "ijt are distributed iid according to a Type I
extreme value distribution,2 but generate correlation through ￿ijt by allowing heterogeneity
in tastes for the product attributes to drive correlation.. So, for example, if "luxury" is an
attribute of a car, then a consumer who likes one luxury car is more likely, then the average
consumer to like another luxury car.



















if j = k
otherwise
Now the own-price elasticity will not be driven solely by functional form. The partial deriv-
ative of the market shares will no longer be determined by a single parameter, ￿. Instead,
each individual will have a di⁄erent price sensitivity, which will be averaged to a product
speci￿c mean price sensitivity using the individual probabilities of purchase as weights. The
price sensitivity will be di⁄erent for di⁄erent products. So if, for example, product j has
lower prices and attracts more price sensitive consumers (i.e., they are more likely to pur-
chase that product than the average consumer) its average price sensitivity will be higher,
implying a lower equilibrium markup. Therefore, own price elasticities are not driven solely
by functional form, but by the di⁄erences in the price sensitivity between consumers who
purchase the various products.
The full model also allows for ￿ exible cross-product substitution patterns, which are not
constrained by a priori segmentation of the market (yet at the same time can take advantage
of this segmentation by including a segment dummy variable as a product characteristic).
The correlation between ￿ijt and ￿ikt will induce correlation between sijt and sikt; and drive
the substitution patterns. Indeed, McFadden and Train (2000) show that this model is
general enough to approximate a wide class of choice problems.
The modeling advantages of the full model do not come without a cost. It is signi￿cantly
more complex to estimate. Furthermore the key in achieving all of these bene￿ts is being
able to estimate a meaningful degree of heterogeneity.
2In principle, we can also allow " to be distributed according to a generalized exterme value distribution
or other distributions, such as a normal distribution.
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In this section I brie￿ y discuss some of the main issues in estimating the demand models.
The estimation of the Almost Ideal Demand System involves mostly standard linear and
non-linear methods and therefore I will focus on the discrete choice model.
Data typically comes in one of two forms: consumer level and market level data. In
both cases we see prices and observed attributes of all products. With market level data
we see the total quantity sold of each product in a number of markets. We also observe
the distribution of demographics, PD, in each market. With consumer level data we see the
match between consumers and their choices, as well as the demographics of consumers. In
some cases we see multiple choices by the same consumer and in rare cases we have survey
data of the second choice (i.e., what the consumers would have chosen if their top option
was not available) Finally, in some cases we will not see consumer level data but might have
some information by demographic group (e.g., the average age of consumers who purchased
j).
Identi￿cation comes from seeing how choices change as the attributes (prices) change and
as the available choices vary. For example, suppose initially we see a choice between three
products, and then we see the choice when product 3 is no longer available. The change in
the market share of products 1 and 2, tells us how close substitutes they are to product 3.
The model then relates this to the relative importance of the various product characteristics.
See Berry and Haile (2009a,b) for a formalization of this argument.
A key issue is the endogeneity of price (and other attributes). Endogeneity arises, just
as it does in the text book examples of demand estimation, if there is correlation between
price and the unobserved product characteristic, ￿jt: This correlation can arise for di⁄erent
reasons, but the most natural is if the ￿rms when setting prices know more about ￿ than the
econometrician (at the extreme case ￿rms observe ￿ when setting prices). Note, that this
correlation can arise regardless of the level of aggregation. Therefore, a common claim that
with consumer level data endogeneity is not a concern, is in general not correct.
To get an idea of how the model is estimated, and how we deal with endogeneity, suppose
we have consumer level data on choices made by a sample of consumers i = 1;:::;N in markets
t = 1;:::;T; each with j = 1;:::;Jt products. Let yit = j if the consumer choose product j in
market t. Equation (9) gives us the probability of this choice. Suppose, for example, that
"ijt are iid extreme value then







The data give us this probability and allows us to estimate the parameters ￿; and ￿ using
simulated maximum likelihood, or simulated method of moments. The estimation will also
recover a product-market speci￿c constant
￿jt = xjt￿ ￿ ￿pjt + ￿jt: (12)
We can use the recovered product-market constants to estimate ￿ and ￿, while dealing with
the correlation of pjt and ￿jt; using standard methods, which we discuss below.
In some cases, however, consumer level data can help deal with the endogeneity problem.
Suppose, for example, that prices vary by individual, yet ￿jt does not. In such a case we
could control for ￿jt with a product-market level ￿xed e⁄ect. Similarly suppose that the
indirect utility is given by equation (7), then the price coe¢ cient, actually the coe¢ cient
on the log(Ii ￿ pjt) term, can be identi￿ed from variation in income, Ii, across consumers,
controlling for ￿jt with a product-market level ￿xed e⁄ect. For any of these to work we
need to observe multiple consumers in the same market purchasing the various products.
However, with a large number of consumers we risk over ￿tting: as we average across many
consumers we have no error left to explain why the model does not perfectly ￿t the data.
Suppose that instead of consumer level data we observe only market level shares of
j = 1;:::;Jt products in markets t = 1;:::;T: In order to use standard methods to deal with
endogeneity we need to extract the error term, ￿jt, from inside the non-linear share equation.
The basic idea of the estimation is to invert the share equations, given by (10) in order to
recover the mean utility given by (12). The inversion exists under general conditions as long
as the products are substitutes (see Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, 1995, or Berry and Haile,
2009b, for proof). Once we compute the mean utility we can write
￿jt = ￿jt(st;￿;￿) ￿ (xjt￿ ￿ ￿pjt):
Just as when we have consumer level data we can write the unobserved characteristics as a
function of data and parameters.
Note that the market shares, observed in aggregate data, and the probability of purchase
as a function demographics, observed in consumer level data, both play a similar role. The
20key di⁄erence between the consumer level data and market level data is that with consumer
level data we can see variation in the choice probability as a function of demographics holding
the attributes, including the unobserved characteristics, ￿xed, while in the market level data
we can see variation in the market shares as both (the distribution of) demographics and
the unobserved attributes change. This di⁄erence allows for some additional ￿ exibility in
identi￿cation using consumer level data (Berry and Haile, 2009a), and is very helpful in
estimation . Indeed, for estimation with aggregate data it is very useful to either have a very
large number of markets, with varying demographics, or some other form of micro moments
(i.e., purchase probabilities by demographic groups.)
Having derived an expression for the unobserved characteristic, ￿jt; as a function of data
and parameters, we can estimate the parameters of the model and deal with endogeneity.
The basic idea is to ￿nd instrumental variables, z, such that
E(￿jtjzjt) = 0: (13)
The instrumental variables usually try to capture variation in cost across products and
markets or variation in markups. Classical instruments for demand use variation in cost,
such as input cost. Typically we have little cost information, especially by product, and
therefore this approach is rarely used. Two exceptions are Nevo (2001), who uses measures
of costs, and Villas-Boas (2007) who uses input costs interacted with product ￿xed e⁄ects.
Hausman (1996) and Nevo (2001) use an alternative approach that does not require direct
measure of costs, instead relying on indirect measures. They use prices of the product in
other markets. The assumption is that after controlling for common e⁄ects, the unobserved
characteristics are independent across markets, while prices will be correlated across markets
due to common marginal cost shocks. The assumption of independence across markets will
be violated, for example, if unobserved promotional activities are correlated across markets.
An alternative approach is to generate instruments by relying on variation in markups.
Berry Levinsohn and Pakes (1995), following on a similar idea in Bresnahan (1981, 1987),
assume that E(￿jtjxjt) = 0 and propose using functions of the characteristics of other prod-
ucts as instruments. The idea is that the markup varies with the degree of competition
faced by the product, which is measured by the proximity in characteristics space to other
products. The instruments are justi￿ed by assuming that xjt are set without knowing ￿jt.
For instance, because they were set prior to the revelation of ￿jt, and ￿jt is not serially
21correlated. Obviously, if ￿jt is serially correlated the timing assumption is not su¢ cient to
justify these instruments.
Another approach is to rely on panel data methods. In a simple form this just means
assuming that ￿jt, at least the part that is correlated with price, can be captured by a rich
enough set of ￿xed e⁄ects. More recently, ideas from the dynamic panel data literature
(Arellano and Bond, 1991, Blundell and Bond, 1998) have been used to motivate the use of
characteristics as instruments. For example, we could assume that ￿jt = ￿￿jt￿1 + ￿jt; where
E(￿jtjxjt￿1) = 0:Using this assumption E(￿jt￿￿￿jt￿1jxjt￿1) = 0 is a valid moment condition
In many of these cases, the identifying assumptions required to justify the instruments
have been questioned (for example, see the discussion by Bresnahan, 1996). For this reason,
Nevo and Rosen (2009) build on the ideas of Manski and Pepper (2000), and explore using
weaker identifying assumptions. Instead of relying on a moment equality as in (13) they
build on a moment inequality and show that under certain conditions the parameters can be
set identi￿ed. Applying this to the estimation of Logit demand they recover a reasonable,
and potentially useful, set of parameters.
A separate issue is whether the instruments are "weak". This issue has rarely been
explored in the IO literature, but could have important implications including problems
with the standard errors and poor numerical performance.
The computation of the model typically follows the above steps of estimation (see Nevo,
2000b, for details and a computer code). Recently Dube et al (2009) o⁄ered an alternative
computational method that bypasses the need for the inversion, instead solving a constrained
optimization problem. Their method seems to work well, and speeds computation somewhat,
especially if the number of market is not very large.
5 Comparing the Models
Having presented the most commonly used models, a natural question is how do they com-
pare. Somewhat surprisingly there have been very few comparisons, either theoretical or
empirical of the two main models. Judging by the academic literature, discrete choice mod-
els seem to be signi￿cantly more popular. In policy work, on the other hand, it seems like
the preference has been for the simpler and maybe easier to estimate, multi-level demand
system.
22On a conceptual level the multi level demand system presented in Section 3.3.1 has some
intuitive appeal: it is closer to classical demand models and seems to provide a ￿ exible
demand system within a segment. However, it has drawn some criticisms. First, the system
requires classi￿cation of the products into segments. In many cases this segmentation is
di¢ cult to justify, but can be important for the bottom line. Supporters claim that di⁄erent
classi￿cations can be tested against each other, but these tests are not very powerful and
ultimately somewhat unconvincing. An approach that does not require weak separability,
relying instead on latent separability that can be identi￿ed from the data, has been proposed
by Blundell and Robin (2000).
Second, the derivation of the demand model, in principle, allows for aggregation of het-
erogenous preferences (assuming these preferences satisfy certain conditions). However, the
derivation usually assumes that consumers consume positive amounts of all products. This
is a reasonable assumption when the products are broad categories, but not with speci￿c
products. The typical consumer might consume more than a single brand, but rarely all
brands. Little is known about the aggregation and approximation properties of the Almost
Ideal Demand Model in this case. This is especially important since in many empirical
applications the results are sensitive to whether or not we impose the restrictions of eco-
nomic theory: adding up restrictions, symmetry and homogeneity. Whether or not we want
to impose these conditions depends on whether we think the aggregate demand properly
represents the demand of a representative consumer.
On the empirical side, the advantage of the multi level demand system is that it is
simpler to estimate, requiring mostly linear estimation methods. Obviously, this saves on
computational time, but maybe more importantly allows us to deal with measurement error
in prices and shares. On the negative side, this system can typically be estimated only when
there are a small, relatively constant across markets, number of products. And it requires a
relatively large number of markets.
It also requires a large number of instrumental variables, which are hard to ￿nd in most
applications. Indeed, the failure of the instruments is one of the explanations typically
o⁄ered for a common pattern observed in empirical applications. Often products that we
(strongly) believe are close substitutes end up being estimated as complements. For example,
Hausman (1996) estimates that Kellogg Raisin Bran and Post Raisin Bran, have a negative
(and statistically signi￿cant) cross price elasticity. This is not uncommon.
23The discrete choice model we discussed in Section 3.4 is very popular in the academic IO
literature but also draws a fair number of complaints. A common concern has to do with the
assumption that consumers choose no more than one good. We know that many households
own more than one car, that many of us buy more than one brand of cereal, and so forth.
We note that even though consumers may buy more than one brand at a time, less actually
consume more than one at a time. Therefore, the discreteness of choice can sometimes be
defended by de￿ning the choice period appropriately. In some cases this will still not be
enough, in which case the researcher might view the model as an approximation, and then
the question becomes if, and under what conditions, is it a reasonable approximation.
Empirically, the discrete choice model is often criticized when shares and prices are mea-
sured with error. Since it is a non-linear model the measurement error can cause signi￿cant
biases. More importantly, in principle the model is ￿ exible and can approximate many
choice situations (McFadden and Train, 2000), but in reality the recovered distribution of
heterogeneity might be quite restrictive and the model might be very close to the Logit
model.
Huang, Rojas and Bass (2008) perform a Monte Carlo experiment comparing the perfor-
mance of various models under di⁄erent data generating processes. They generally ￿nd that
a Logit model out performs the multi stage demand system. Their analysis is interesting but
leaves many open questions, like a better understanding of the sources of bias and a study
of the performance of additional demand structures.
6 Extensions of the Discrete Choice Model
In the academic IO literature the discrete choice model is by far the more popular choice for
estimating demand. The basic model we presented has been extended in several ways. We
brie￿ y discuss some of these extensions here.
6.1 Consumer Welfare
One of the most common uses of demand models is to compute consumer welfare. This
could either be the main motivation for the estimation (Trajtenberg, 1989, Nevo, 2003) or
as a side to computing another counterfactual (for example, Nevo, 2000b, for mergers).
24Computing consumer welfare using the discrete choice model is straightforward and relies
on the inclusive value. McFadden (1978) de￿nes the inclusive value (or social surplus) as the
expected utility of a consumer, from several discrete options, prior to observing ("i0t;:::"iJt),
knowing that the choice will be made to maximize utility after observing these shocks. When
the idiosyncratic shocks "ijt are distributed i.i.d. extreme value, the inclusive value from a











When ￿i = ￿ and ￿i = ￿ the inclusive value captures the average utility in the population,
averaging over the individual draws of ", hence the term social surplus. When the utility
is linear in price, as in equation (6), the inclusive value can be converted into a monetary
equivalent by dividing by ￿i. See McFadden (1981) and Small and Rosen (1981) for further
details.
Petrin (2002) uses a discrete choice model to evaluate the welfare gains from the in-
troduction of mini vans. He estimates a discrete choice model and uses it to compute a
counterfactual of what the market would have looked like if the minivan were not intro-
duced. He then uses the model again to compute the welfare in the two states of the world
￿the one observed and the counterfactual one ￿and attributes the di⁄erence to the intro-
duction of the minivan. He claims that the Logit model, which does not allow for consumer
heterogeneity, will overestimate the consumer gains. His logic is that every new option in-
troduced in the Logit model will mechanically increase welfare because it gives the consumer
another draw from the distribution of ". Since the chosen product is the option with the
highest utility, the consumer￿ s utility should increase with the availability of another option.
His solution, to try to reduce this e⁄ect, is to minimize the role of " by relying more on
random coe¢ cients for heterogeneity. Berry and Pakes (2007) take this idea one step fur-
ther and drop the epsilons all together in a model they call the pure characteristics demand
model.3
As I argued above, allowing for heterogeneity in ￿i and ￿i is important, among other
things, to generate reasonable elasticities. Indeed, allowing for heterogeneity can also have
3As I explained above, "ijt help rationalize observed choices. Indeed, once we drop them the model can
in principle have di¢ culity rationalizing certain patterns of behavior. See Athey and Imbens (2007) for a
discussion of the potential problems with the pure characteristcs model and an alternative model.
25an impact on the computation of welfare, but I think the source of the problem is slightly
di⁄erent then that identi￿ed by Petrin. The exercise Petrin performs has two steps: gener-
ating a counterfactual and then summarizing the counterfactual (and observed) prices and
quantities into a welfare measure. Petrin identi￿es the second step as the source of the
problem. I claim it is the ￿rst step that generates the problem, and I demonstrate this claim
with the help of a classic example due to Debreu (1960) often called the "red-bus blue-bus
example". Consider a market where consumers choose between driving their car to work or
taking the red bus (for simplicity assume that working at home is not an option and that
the decision of whether to work or not does not depend on the mode of transportation).
Half the consumers choose a car and half choose the red bus. Now suppose we arti￿cially
introduce a new option: a blue bus. This option is arti￿cial because consumers do not care
about the color of the bus and in their eyes the red and blue buses are identical (suppose our
consumers are color blind). Furthermore, suppose that prices are regulated, so they are not
impacted by the introduction of the blue bus, and the frequency and quality of bus service
is also not impacted. In reality, the introduction of this supposedly new option will result
in an equilibrium where, as before, half the consumers choose a car, and the rest are split
between the two color buses. Consumer welfare has not changed.
Now suppose we want to use the Logit model to analyze the consumer welfare generated
by the introduction of the blue bus. Suppose we only observe data pre introduction of the
blue bus and use it to estimate the model. Normalizing the mean utility from car, the outside
good, to zero will yield ￿car = ￿(red)bus = 0, since scar = s(red)bus = 0:5, which implies an
inclusive value of ln(e0 + e0) = ln(2). Since the value of a blue bus is equal to the value
of the red bus, i.e., ￿red_bus = ￿blue_bus = 0, if we use these estimates to simulate what the
market would look like post introduction we will predict scar = sred_bus = sblue_bus = 1=3,
which implies an inclusive value of ln(3). In other words, we would predict a welfare gain
when none was present.
Suppose we could eliminate the ￿rst step, of predicting the counterfactual market. This
could be done if we observe the market post introduction. Given the above description the
market share post-introduction will be scar = 0:5 and sred_bus = sblue_bus = 0:25 implying
￿car = 0 and ￿red_bus = ￿blue_bus = ln(0:5), and an inclusive value of ln(e0+2￿eln(0:5)) = ln(2):
So if we observed the correct market shares we would get the correct welfare estimate. Hence,
in this example, and my claim is also more generally, the Logit model fails in the ￿rst step.
26The reason this result holds more generally in the Logit model, and not just in this example,
is that combining equation (11) with the inclusive value for all the options, given by equation
(14) yields that the expected utility is ln(1=s0t). Since s0t did not change in the observed
data the Logit model predicted no welfare gain, but using the Logit model to generate the
counterfactual market shares generated incorrect predictions. The Monte Carlo results in
Berry and Pakes (2007) seem to provide a similar answer. They ￿nd that using the pure
characteristics model matters for the estimated elasticities (and mean utilities) but not the
welfare numbers. They conclude that "the fact that the contraction ￿ts the shares exactly
means that the extra gain from the logit errors is o⁄set by lower ￿￿ s, and this roughly
counteracts the problems generated for welfare measurement by the model with tastes for
products."
Just to be clear, I am not claiming that the Logit would be a good model to use, just
that we have to be clear what are its shortcomings. Furthermore, the di⁄erence between the
Logit model and the Mixed Logit model in the change in welfare from period t to period
























Since both models perfectly ￿t the market shares, i.e., s0;t =
R
si;0;tdPD(D)dPv(v); the
di⁄erence depends on the change in the heterogeneity in the probability of choosing the
outside option, si;0;t. It is important to note that this di⁄erence can be positive or negative.
6.2 Multiple choices
A common complaint about discrete choice models is that often they are applied to cases
where choices are not discrete. For example, we might observe consumers buying several cans
of soft drinks on a shopping trip, or households who own more than a single car. One way to
rationalize the multiple choices is to assume that they are just aggregation over several choice
instances. For example, a consumer shopping in a store is buying for a week. So assuming
each day is a choice decision means that if the consumer bought 5 cans of soft drinks they
decided to choose the outside option on two of the choice occasions. While providing a
rationalization for the observed behavior this explanation is unappealing, in part because it
assumes the choices across days are independent.
27There are two potential issues to deal with when modeling multiple choices. First, the
utility from product j might depend on whether product k is also chosen. Second, the choices
could interact through a budget, or other, constraint.
Manski and Sherman (1980) study households choices of cars taking into account their
current holdings. Their model accounts for the e⁄ect of past purchases on current decisions,
but does not allow for simultaneous purchase of more than one option. Gentzkow (2007)
looks at consumers choice between print and online newspapers, allowing for purchase of
more than one option accounting for an interaction in the utility. In his model, consumers
choose between the printed version of a newspaper, the online version, both, or neither.
Thus, the choice is a discrete choice between bundles. Because the number of choices is
small he is able to estimate the model using standard tools. However, for larger number
of options a choice between bundles is not feasible to estimate this way. For example, for
J = 25 there are 225 = 33;554;432 di⁄erent bundles available.
Hendel (1999) studies a multi-discrete choice situation. In his case he observes ￿rms
simultaneously buying several brands of computers and several units of each brand, hence
the nondiscreteness is in two dimensions. He models the choice of several brands as an
aggregation over several tasks. The ￿rm has several tasks to do. For each task there is an
optimal brand, but the observed purchases are aggregation over several tasks. Note, that he
does not allow for interaction in the utility from the di⁄erent choices. The purchase of several
units is explained by a decreasing marginal utility from quantity, hence there is interaction
in this dimension.
Nevo, Rubinfeld and McCabe (2005) also study a multi choice problem. They examine
the decision of libraries to subscribe to Economics and Business journals. There are over 150
possible journals a library can subscribe. All the libraries in their data subscribe to some
subset of these journals, although the subsets are not nested (i.e., one could not model this is
a choice of how many journals to purchase). They do not allow the utility from the journals
to interact, but the interaction is through a budget constraint. Speci￿cally, the journals
are ranked by an index like that given in equation (6), and journals are purchased until a
constraint is met.
286.3 Dynamics
The demand models discussed above are static. However, in many markets demand is dy-
namic in the sense that (a) consumers current decisions a⁄ect their future utility, or (b)
consumers￿current decisions depend on expectations about the evolution of future states.
There is a long line of papers studying dynamic discrete choices. For example, Heckman
(1981) and Flinn and Heckman (1982) study labor force dynamics where choices are dy-
namic in the sense that current decisions a⁄ect future states but consumers are not forward
looking. Miller (1984), Wolpin (1984), Pakes (1986) and Rust (1987), study various decisions
by economic agents using dynamic programming models of discrete choice. These methods
have been applied widely.
In the context of demand for di⁄erentiated products, the exact e⁄ect of dynamics di⁄ers
depending on the circumstances, and can be generated for di⁄erent reasons. The literature
has focused on several cases including storable products, durable products, habit formation,
switching costs and learning. The key issue for this literature is how to write a model that
accounts for all the products yet keeps the state space tractable. We summarize some of the
key papers here. See Aguirregabiria and Nevo (2010) for a further review.
Consider storable products, if storage costs are not too large and current price is low
relative to future prices (i.e., the product is on sale), there is an incentive for consumers to
store the product and consume it in the future. Pesendorfer (2002) and Hendel and Nevo
(2006a) present evidence that consumers indeed store when prices are low. Hendel and Nevo
(2006b, and 2010) extend the above static models to allow for stoarability. They ￿nd that
the static model overestimates the price elasticity and underestimates the cross price e⁄ects.
In the case of durable products, dynamics arise due to similar trade-o⁄s. The existence
of transaction costs in the resale market of durable goods (for example, because of adverse
selection) implies that a consumer￿ s decision today of whether or not to buy a durable good,
and which product to buy, is costly to change in the future and, for that reason, it will impact
her future utility. Therefore, when a consumer makes a purchase, she is in￿ uenced by her
current holdings of the good and by her expectations about future prices and attributes of
available products.
The impact of durable products on static estimation di⁄er if we think there is repeat
purchase or not. There are two problems with the standard static random coe¢ cients discrete
choice model if there are no repeat purchases (see Melnikov, 2000, and Conlon, 2010). First,
29the distribution of the random coe¢ cients is likely to change over time as some consumers
purchase and exit the market. For example, if prices fall over time its likely that less price
sensitive consumers purchase initially. Second, if consumers are forward looking then they
realize there is an option value to not purchasing today. This option value is re￿ ected in the
value of the outside option.
With repeat purchases the issues are a bit di⁄erent (see Gowrisankaran and Rysman,
2009). First, the distribution of the consumers does not change, since consumers do not
exit. However, consumers who previously purchased a product have a di⁄erent value of no
purchase since their alternative is to stay with their current product. Therefore, the problem
with static estimation is that it does not account for the di⁄erent value, across consumers
and over time, of the outside option. Second, now when purchasing consumers realize that
how long they hold onto the product is endogenous and therefore it changes their valuation
of the options. For example, consumers might ￿nd it optimal to buy an inferior option ￿
in the sense that it delivers lower ￿ ow utility ￿but replace quickly with a better/cheaper
future option.
7 Concluding Comments
Demand estimation is at the heart of modern empirical IO. As a result IO economists have
developed modeling and estimation methods, and certain norms about what is acceptable.
As the IO community has grown some of these developments have been isolated from the
rest of the profession. One interesting direction for future work is to explore more carefully
connections with other areas of economics where models of consumer behavior have devel-
oped. These areas for the most part have developed separately from IO. See, for example,
Blundell and Robin (2000), Lewbel (2001), Blundell, Browning and Crawford (2008), Blow,
Browning and Crawford, (2008), and Lewbel, and Pendakur (2009).
Another direction for expansion and cross ￿eld fertilization is with other ￿elds of applied
micro. Recently there has been an increase in the use of various methods developed in IO.
Hopefully, these methods will become common in other applied micro ￿elds. The scope of
applications of these methods is quite wide and as the set of applications increase interesting
methodological issues are likely to arise. Furthermore, as IO economists work in areas
30common to other applied micro ￿elds some of the methods and concerns of these ￿elds are
likely to impact IO in general and studies of consumer behavior.
There is a long tradition in econometrics of using semi-parametric and non-parametric
methods to estimate demand models as well as discrete choice models. The IO literature
discussed has relied mostly on tightly speci￿ed parametric models focusing mainly on issues
of endogeneity, consumer heterogeneity and product di⁄erentiation. Current non-parametric
estimation can still not handle the dimensionality of the typical problem studied in IO. Future
work, however, is likely to explore ways to relax some of the functional form assumptions
currently made.
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